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David Hartstein started KaBloom in 1998 with thegoal of creating “the Starbucks of Flowers.” He suc-cessfully built brand recognition for the garden-
like shops, but problems plagued the young organization.
Nearly three years and one recession later, KaBloom failed
to live up to Hartstein’s forecast of exponential growth.This
case has been designed for a graduate-level course in entre-
preneurship/innovation. Students can compare franchis-
ing with other business models, examine the impact of
organizational structure and leadership styles on business
effectiveness, relate issues of supply chain management
and logistics to environmental changes, and recognize the
impact of innovation on business sustainability.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, franchising, supply chain man-
agement, innovation, leadership style
“There are questions that arise from my experience,” said
David Hartstein, founder of KaBloom, as he ticked them off
on his fingers. “These are things I should have known, but
somehow I did not. Number one: When you’re under pres-
sure to expand, what is the best way to grow the organiza-
tion? Number two: How do you select franchisees? Number
three:Why did so many things go wrong? It should have all
worked. Number four: Which lessons from the fast-food
industry actually transfer well into the flower industry? And
the most important question I ask myself,”he said,pointing to
his pinky finger,“is how can I make money from the flower
business?”
The Flower Industry in the United States
The flower industry was one of the largest agricultural indus-
tries in the United States, ranked third after corn and soy-
beans by the U.S. Census of Agriculture. The Bureau of
Economic Analysis, estimated the total floriculture item sales
at retail outlets at about $19.2 billion in 2005. Per capita
spending at the retail level on floral products in the same
year was about $55. The 2007 analysis by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis 2007 showed an increase in sales of floral
products to $20.1 billion.
The floriculture industry was divided into five major sec-
tors: cut flowers, potted flowering plants, foliage plants, bed-
ding and garden plants, and cut cultivated greens. These
industry segments were different in terms of the number of
outlets: an estimate of 22,753 retail florist shops, 21,783
supermarkets selling flowers, 16,432 plant nurseries and gar-
den centers,900 floral wholesalers,and 11,000 domestic pro-
ducers (www.aboutflowers.com/press_b1.html). The tradi-
tional market channels of the flower industry were growers,
importers, and the wholesalers or retailers (http://www
.safnow.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id
=6263&Itemid=149).
More than 80 percent of the flowers sold in the United
States were imported from several countries in South
America and Europe.The major sources of imported flowers
were Colombia, Ecuador, Netherlands, Costa Rica, Mexico,
and Canada as shown in Table 1. There were two major U.S.
border hubs for imported flowers: Miami International
Airport in Florida with a capability to handle 85 percent of
the 65,000 tons of fresh flowers imported each year, and
Memphis, Tennessee, which handled a small percent of
imported flowers. These two hubs were equipped with all
necessary facilities to handle fresh flowers, in addition to a
sufficient number of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
officers for daily inspection of the large flower shipments
(http://southeastagnet.com/2008/01/23/usda-breaks-ground-
on-new-inspection-facility-in-miami/).
The major outlets where the flowers were sold differ in
size and location.The most popular outlets were supermar-
kets, with an estimated 29 percent of total sales. Less popular
outlets included mass merchandisers with 21 percent of the
total sales, home centers with 16 percent of the total sales,
garden centers with 15 percent of the total sales, and whole-
sale clubs with 3 percent of the total sales. Retail florists
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Table 1. Sources of Flowers—Top 6 
Import Countries by Value (2007)
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Source: Society of American Florists (SAF).
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accounted for only 14 percent of the total sales.The Internet
accounted for 2.4 percent of all flower and plant purchases
in 2005. Internet transactions made up 9.1 percent of pur-
chases and 12.3 percent of spending on floral arrangements
(Ipsos/AFE Consumer Tracking Study, 2005 CONSUMER).
The flower industry was among the most sensitive-to-
change industries in the market for two reasons. First, flow-
ers were a very delicate commodity.The life span of flowers
was relatively short, making the flower industry one of the
fastest turnover businesses in the economy. Second, industry
performance was sensitive to several factors such as weath-
er, high energy prices impacting delivery costs, and fluctua-
tions in currency exchange rates (especially when the dollar
value was decreasing).Changes in supply channels could cre-
ate volatility in prices and availability. Most importantly, the
U.S. trade agreements, particularly with South American
countries where most of flowers were imported from, could
have a significant impact on the industry.
In 1989, Ruth Owades launched Calyx & Corolla, a high-
end florist that shipped direct from the farm to the customer.
Calyx & Corolla originally sold its flower by catalog/direct
mail and later expanded to include a website, becoming the
first “virtual”company in the flower industry.Calyx & Corolla
extended vase life by eliminating middlemen in the distribu-
tion process and shipped its orders next-day delivery via
FedEx in custom-designed packages. By 1998, its catalog was
the most widely circulated floral catalog, with more than 12
million copies distributed. In 1998, Calyx & Corolla generat-
ed sales of more than $20 million (Business Wire, 1999).
Flowers could clearly become big business.
A new and effective e-business model that used
Information Technology and Internet tools for reaching cus-
tomers, providing better customer services for less cost, and
utilizing supply chain process was added to the flower indus-
try post 2001. The e-Business model granted a competitive
advantage by providing customers with easy and convenient
access to flowers with low cost for retailers,wholesalers, and
distributers alike through user-friendly websites supported
by good delivery systems.
The History of KaBloom
While traveling overseas, David Hartstein (former Staples
executive, and cofounder of Super Office, the first office sup-
plies superstore chain in Israel) and Thomas Stemberg (for-
mer chairman and CEO of Staples Inc.) observed that
Europeans purchased fresh flowers not only for special occa-
sions but also as an everyday item for personal pleasure.
Hartstein speculated, “Would it be possible to reinvent the
U.S. floral industry along the European model?”
The question was a timely one as Hartstein had been
“looking at retail chains to consolidate and [Stemberg] said
the flower industry would be perfect” (Forbes Online,
2000).He discarded early thoughts of launching a fast-food
restaurant with a health food menu (Reidy, 1998) and in July
1997, Hartstein returned to Boston to build KaBloom.
Optimism and success were in Hartstein’s blood. A 1986
Suffolk University MBA alumnus, his history included a stint
in the Israeli army and diplomatic corps as well as increasing-
ly responsible positions in industry that culminated in his
founding Super Office and, subsequently, serving as president
and CEO of an international consulting firm established by
the director of the Institute for Social and Economic Policy in
the Middle East at the JFK School of Government. But a new
challenge was calling him.
Hartstein and Stemberg wanted to promote the vision of
buying flowers for personal enjoyment at any time.To accom-
plish this they had to offer a shopping experience that pro-
moted this kind of enjoyment by making it easy for the con-
sumer to get a wide choice of high-quality flowers at conven-
ient locations.Their goal was to increase flower consumption
in the United States. Hartstein described this concept as “the
Starbucks of Flowers”—a company that would change the
way Americans thought about flowers just as Starbucks
changed the concept of a morning cup of coffee.They want-
ed to encourage shoppers to buy flowers as often as they
bought bread or milk by making them available on shelves in
every kind of retail location.
Hartstein and Stemberg had done their homework and
they believed that the market opportunity existed. Their
research revealed the following:
• In 1996, the U.S. retail market for fresh cut flowers and
potted plants totaled $12.9 billion. In addition, the bed-
ding and garden segment garnered $2.6 billion, for total
floriculture sales of $15.5 billion.The domestic retail flo-
ral market was extremely fragmented with more than
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Table 2. Distribution Channels
Traditional Florists Supermarkets
Limited hours Extended hours
Limited on-hand inventory Limited assortmenta
Individualized service Irregular service (if at all)
High pricing Competitive pricing for avail-
able stock
Bad Locations Convenient locations,“Where
People Shop Everyday”
Bad ambiance (typically not
clean)
No ambiance
Questionable quality Poor quality
a. In January 1998, a typical Stop and Shop store in the Northeast had only
19 SKUs for flowers. Star Market had 18 SKUs (IAMCO, 1996).
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14,350 supermarket floral departments and 36,000
retail florists. Fewer than 2 percent of specialty florists
belonged to a chain.
• Sales through specialty channels, including retail florists,
garden centers, toll-free call centers, street vendors, and
mail catalogs totaled 57 percent of sales or $8.8 billion.
The specialty market suffered from poor customer per-
ception of quality, assortment, and service.
• Sales through mass market channels, including super-
markets, discount stores, do-it-yourself (DIY)/hardware
stores, convenience, department, and drug stores totaled
33 percent of industry-wide sales or $5.1 billion.Despite
poor customer perceptions, this channel had grown sig-
nificantly over the previous decade (IAMCO, 1996).
Thus, they concluded that KaBloom could enter the high-
ly fragmented $15.5 billion U.S. retail floriculture industry
and fill a unique market niche. They intended to create a
strong and efficient supply chain by remaining close to the
source of flowers, the growers. KaBloom offered an exciting
new distribution opportunity that would increase their sales
and help offset the seasonality of wholesalers’ business.
Wholesalers were willing to accept a gross margin on their
key accounts of 12 percent, down from 35 percent on stan-
dard business (IAMCO, 1996, 57). KaBloom was therefore
confident in its ability to source fresh cut, high-quality flow-
ers and plants through these distributors at an advantageous
cost structure.KaBloom even planned eventually to purchase
directly from growers in Ecuador and Colombia, providing a
large degree of inventory and quality control.
In addition, KaBloom could provide its customers with a
wide assortment of high-quality, fresh-cut flowers and plants
at discount prices.At that time, high-quality and competitive
pricing were mutually exclusive. While florists generally
attempted to provide consumers with a selection of high-
quality fresh cut flowers,neither their prices nor their on-site
assortment were comparable. Some supermarkets sold flow-
ers at a lower price, but quality, freshness, and selection were
inconsistent. With its simplified and efficient distribution
chain, Hartstein believed his company would have vastly
improved logistics that would support better pricing and bet-
ter inventory management.
The retail flower industry was served by two primary dis-
tribution channels, traditional florists and supermarkets,with
different characteristics (KaBloom’s Business Plan).
Hartstein believed he could compete on all of the merits
of both channels and thus develop an underserved market of
customers who wanted the benefits of cash and carry, (every-
day low pricing, large assortment, cleanliness, and long
hours), with strong, user-friendly service. With its pricing
lower than both supermarkets and retail outlets, KaBloom
offered an ease of shopping contrary to existing, intimidating
shopping environments.
KaBloom identified four industry trends, the opportunities
they posed, and unique ways to execute them, as indicated
Table 3 (KaBloom’s Business Plan).
In addition, most specialty florists and mass market retail-
ers did not carry a diverse inventory, concentrating instead
on mainstream flowers. However, by not carrying 46 percent
of what was being demanded by consumers, these retailers
were losing sales. KaBloom offered a wide selection of flow-
ers, ranging from mainstream to more exotic, tropical flow-
ers. In 1996, roses, carnations, and chrysanthemums account-
ed for 54 percent of the flowers sold in the United States.The
remaining 46 percent,up from 38 percent in 1989, represent-
ed an opportunity to a full-selection chain like KaBloom
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/Publications/Flo/2007/09Sep/FLO
2007.pdf page 64).
Finally, foreign flower growers were diversifying their
range of products. Besides growing roses, carnations, and
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Table 3. Industry Trends
Trend Opportunity Execution
Sources of supply shift offshore. Reduced cost of wider assortment of flowers. With 150 stores and central purchasing,
KaBloom would buy directly from the 
growers.
Consumers have higher expectations. No one was currently meeting all of their
needs, particularly for low-cost specialty 
flowers.
KaBloom would meet customers’ needs
through high assortment, high-quality, low-
cost flowers that could be easily accessed.
Growers were attempting to become more
sophisticated and add more value.
Growers were willing and more able than
ever before to work with downstream 
partners.
KaBloom would buy directly from the 
growers.
Management information systems (MIS) 
had advanced and offered extensive
capabilities.
MIS could be used to control and track inven-
tory, to forecast sales, and to communicate
between stores and headquarters. Flower
stores were not using MIS effectively, particu-
larly with respect to inventory control.
KaBloom would implement a state-of-the-art
MIS system at a cost of approximately
$15,000 per store.
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chrysanthemums, they were producing more exotic tropical
flowers that yield higher margins. KaBloom planned to lever-
age its position with growers by the nature of its size and
relationships, and therefore realize advantageous cost struc-
tures. With more than 150 stores, KaBloom would be the
highest retail purchaser of fresh cut flowers in the United
States.
Hartstein knew it was important to choose the first store
locations strategically. He looked for locations and communi-
ties where “income per capita was over $50,000, with a pop-
ulation of more than 100,000, with over 30,000 cars driving
very slowly by.” His research had revealed that consumers
who bought the most floral products were likely to be afflu-
ent and purchase them for their own enjoyment as well as for
more traditional gift uses. The two highest income groups,
($50,000–$74,999 and $75,000 and above) represented 31.9
percent of the total U.S. households and purchased 41.5 per-
cent of all fresh cut flowers. In addition,as household income
rose, the percent of households purchasing flowers also rose
(Behe and Wolnick, 1991).
KaBloom targeted locations in high-density, high-visibility,
high-income, white-collar, metropolitan areas with high foot
and/or vehicular traffic. The first proposed site was on
Needham Street in Newton, Massachusetts, where, within a
three-mile radius, the average income was more than $70,000
(Newton-Needham Chamber of Commerce). Spending per
capita there was approximately 35 percent higher than the
national average or about 20 percent higher than the
Northeast average.Thus, the average spending per capita in
Newton was estimated at $68.Table 4 illustrates the volume
potential for a retail flower store on Needham Street in
Newton, Massachusetts (KaBloom’s Business Plan).
KaBloom store volume was projected at $483,000 for the
first year of operation, growing to $798,000 in the fifth year.
A total of $483,000 per year represented 95 transactions per
day at an average transaction of $13.95. While sales predic-
tions for stores increased as they matured, average KaBloom
store volume was predicted to be $645,000 in year five when
150 stores were open.
The second store location was Harvard Square. Hartstein
gave the example of the Brattle Square Florist at Harvard
Square, which had sales of $1.9 million a year.The size of the
store was 1500 square feet, which translated to $1,266.67 of
sales per square foot.“Despite these impressive sales figures,
Brattle Square Florist was unsophisticated in its systems and
operations, and the owners clearly understood that their
advantage lay in their location.While 90 percent of the tradi-
tional florist’s sales were derived from deliveries, this store
achieved 60 to 70 percent of its sales volume through walk-
ins” (KaBloom’s Business Plan).
By comparison, KaBloom projected store sales at $483.33
per square foot in a store’s first year, increasing to $798.00 in
its fifth year.“KaBloom,”Hartstein explained,“would have the
same advantage of Brattle Square as far as premium location.
However, it would have attractive and easy-to-shop stores,
sophisticated systems and operations, a talented manage-
ment team, and superior customer service.”
By the end of 1998, KaBloom had opened two stores.
Customers could also buy KaBloom flowers at
www.KaBloom.com and by telephone at 1-800-KaBloom.The
eye-catching stores, located in high-vehicle/foot traffic areas,
were adorned with bright purple awnings and stocked a
huge variety of flowers in gardenlike settings, encouraging
impulse purchases by passersby. Hartstein said,“We saw our-
selves as a flower shop, not a florist.We were in the business
of flowers. I became passionate about the business of flow-
ers. I fell in love with it.”
KaBloom’s strategy was to open company-owned stores
and appoint store managers,hiring only service-oriented asso-
ciates who would demonstrate a real interest in flowers and
plants.“A walk in our store is like a walk in a garden,”claimed
Hartstein.The KaBloom garden made flowers affordable to all
and included 200 varieties of fresh cut flowers, compared
with an average of 40 at the largest supermarkets and 20 at
most florists. KaBloom kept their prices low—about half the
industry norm—by buying directly from growers and distrib-
utors, as opposed to purchasing from wholesalers.
Instead of the impersonal, low-contact environment that
was traditional in florist shops, KaBloom’s well-trained asso-
ciates were advised to greet customers as soon as they
entered the store,and to make the store as much a part of the
street scene as could be possible. Open doors and flowers
appearing to tumble onto the sidewalk enhanced the sensa-
tion of entering a garden.“We created a common look for our
stores, in design, lighting, layout and signage.We visually dif-
ferentiated ourselves from existing florists.We created brand
recognition, similar to what Starbucks had achieved,”
explained Hartstein.
Problems Arose
The Valentine’s Day Debacle
Taking orders on the Internet had proven to be a successful
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Table 4. Potential Volume for Retail Flower Store on
Needham Street, Newton, Massachusetts
Total population within 3-mile radius 115,000
Per capita spending $68.00
Current total retail sales $7,820,000
COGS @ 40% $3,128,000
Total retail @ 50% gross margin $6,256,000
10% market share $625,600
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method of doing business for KaBloom. Due to the large
number of orders to deliver on Valentine’s Day 2001, 70 driv-
ers had been contracted through local temp agencies that
promised to deliver drivers with their own vehicles.
Unfortunately, 25 drivers did not show up, leaving some 500
orders for Valentine’s Day flowers undelivered. KaBloom did
not have a written binding contract with the temp agencies,
and the agency that failed to deliver was later removed from
KaBloom’s vendor list.All that was left to do was to “put the
fire out,” explained Hartstein.
He sprang into action, contacting the logical delivery
source—FedEx, which wanted to charge a fee of $50 per
delivery. His immediate response was “There was no way in
hell I was going to pay $25,000 for those deliveries!” The
press response was brutal. The 11:00 P.M. news featured
KaBloom as destroying people’s Valentine’s Day.“Every single
news outlet in the area featured a story of our missed deliv-
eries.This was very bad PR for us.”
Eventually, Hartstein refunded all 500 orders, then deliv-
ered 500 bouquets the next day to make up for the missing
Valentine’s Day flowers and delivered complimentary tulips
to each of the recipients of the missing orders on April 15.
His decision to forego the FedEx delivery because of its
$25,000 price tag ended up costing him $45,000 instead.
Huge Turnover and Too Much Payroll
Under the existing circumstances, it became difficult to moti-
vate store personnel to put in the long hours needed to sus-
tain the business. In the interest of efficiency, Hartstein
opened the Design Center in Woburn to centralize design
and distribution.This created morale issues since it took away
the one thing employees liked to do most—design the
flower arrangements. In addition, if a customer complained
about the design, the employee, who hadn’t created the
design, still had to respond to the customer’s complaint.
Employees became frustrated by this situation.
High turnover and a demoralized staff created a situation
in which corporate payroll became astronomical.As less qual-
ified store personnel were hired, additional district managers
were needed to supervise them. Gross profit from the stores
could not sustain corporate overhead. More than half of the
stores’ income was devoted to marketing, some of which
paid back very limited returns. In order to cover costs, the
average store needed sales of $375,000 (see Table 5).
In addition, the turnover at the store level had an impact
on store sales and on the community ties upon which
KaBloom counted for its everyday sales. Even shrinkage
(anticipated losses due to flower perishability) was affected.
According to KaBloom’s business plan, “An industry rule of
thumb is that inventory shrink averages 10%.” The shrinkage
rate was dependent, in large part on the temperature and
hydration of the flowers during transport and, as new
employees were in constant need of training, the care with
which flowers were handled in the stores became variable
and shrinkage increased.
Decision to Franchise
Nearly three years and one recession later KaBloom failed to
live up to Hartstein’s forecast, with just 34 locations. That
number decreased to 30 when the unprofitable stores were
closed. Sales hit only $8 million in 2000, but grew to $15 mil-
lion by 2001.
Hartstein decided to investigate franchising as a way to
ensure KaBloom’s success and to take the business in a new
direction (see Table 6). Franchising would provide risk mini-
mization for both the franchisor and franchisee.The success
rate for new franchise businesses was much higher than
other types of new businesses because franchises operated
within a proven system.That system included an established
concept, sound business plan, support for getting started
(i.e., training materials, store design, sources for goods), and
marketing support.
The franchisor could expand the business and increase
brand awareness rapidly with little risk and a smaller invest-
ment than other business models required. Incremental
financial risks were transferred to the franchisee, who paid
the franchisor royalties on gross sales.Royalties in franchising
systems were payable regardless of profitability, transferring
the major risk to the franchisee. The risk for the franchisor
was primarily the loss of control of an individual location,
possibly resulting in lower quality stores that had an adverse
impact on the brand of the franchise overall.
The franchising idea seemed to make sense—risk was lim-
ited and the income potential for the franchisor seemed
boundless, as long as the right people bought the franchises.
However, Hartstein’s initial investors were opposed to fran-
chising because franchising would not return as much imme-
diate profit as company-owned stores. Hartstein had original-
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Table 5. Estimated Annual Costs per Store 
Fixed costs
Labor (payroll, benefits, and taxes) $100,000
Rent and utilities $50,000
Other expenses (administration, insurance, etc.) $30,000
Variable costs based on sales revenue
Cost of goods 44% of Sales
Royalties 
5.5% to 4.5% depending on gross sales 5% of Sales
Source: D. Hartstein.
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ly raised more than $15 million in venture capital (Forbes
Online, 2000), and these investors had to be served. The
founder and former CEO of Dunkin’ Donuts, the internation-
ally renowned coffee and doughnut store, advised Hartstein
to move toward franchising because his own success with
the strategy was well known. Hartstein was amenable, but
the investors remained uninterested. Sales were stagnant and
problems continued to grow.
In late 2001, Hartstein made the decision to change the
business model to one based on franchising. Tension
between the investors’ goal of return on investment and
Hartstein’s goal of ongoing royalties created conflict but
Hartstein was adamant. In February 2002, he assumed voting
control of KaBloom and the company underwent a signifi-
cant reorganization through capital restructuring.
A Happy Story of Growth
KaBloom Franchising Corp, established for the purpose of
selling KaBloom franchises, offered its first franchises on
October 30, 2001.The initial step in this process was to put
together a Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC), a
legal document in which the franchisor disclosed all informa-
tion that the franchisee needed to make an informed deci-
sion on investing in that franchise.The contents and disclo-
sures in the UFOC were governed by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).A UFOC contained 23 categories of infor-
mation including the franchisor’s and franchisee’s obliga-
tions, specific territory in question, and initial and ongoing
fees. Many states also had additional state-specific require-
ments.The franchisor was required to give each prospective
franchisee the UFOC at least 10 business days prior to sign-
ing the Franchise Agreement.
KaBloom developed a national UFOC and then produced
a set of revised state-specific documents.The estimated cost
of setting up a new franchise store was $250,000 including
the initial franchise fee. This investment was significantly
higher than to open an independent florist shop.The cost did
not deter prospective franchisees.The initial aim was to have
each store generate $600,000 of revenue (Reidy, 1998).
A franchisee could open a single store or purchase a terri-
tory to open several stores or other flower outlets.The fran-
chisee cost per additional store was significantly less than the
franchise fee for the first store. If someone wanted to open
three stores, he or she paid $30,000 for the first store and
$5,000 as a down payment on each of the other stores.When
the time came to open the second store, the cost was a total
of $25,000 (less the original $5,000 down payment), and the
cost for the third store was a total of $20,000. Multiple outlet
franchisees were encouraged.
In addition to the initial franchise fee, the franchisee was
required to pay the franchisor monthly fees. Royalty pay-
ments were a percentage of gross revenues on a graduated
basis (i.e., 5.5% of the first $350,000, 5.0% from
$350,000–$550,000, and 4.5% over $550,000). Additionally,
franchisees were required to contribute to the advertising
fund (3% of sales) and e-commerce fund (2% of sales).
Hartstein was named a finalist for the New England
Entrepreneur of the Year award in 2001 by Ernst & Young.
Once franchising became the operational strategy, the busi-
ness took off in a period of euphoric growth. KaBloom sold
franchises directly as well as through franchise brokers.The
first franchisee bought the Andover, Massachusetts (formerly
company owned) store in March 2002. By the end of 2002,
KaBloom reduced the number of company-owned stores to
12 and had 31 stores operating with 15 franchisees operat-
ing 19 stores across two states. By the end of 2004, KaBloom
had tripled the total number of stores to about 100 stores
including 88 franchised stores across 29 states. This was
exceptional growth in only three years of franchising.There
were 120 active franchisees and many more stores in the
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Table 6. Comparison of Risk/Reward 
for Franchising and Owner-Operated Stores





Speed of Expansion High High
Profit Potential High High




Source:A composite of information from http://www.francorp.com/
howto/why.asp, http://www.nationalfranchise.com/whyfranch.html, and
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/small/Eq-Inc/Franchising.html.
According to Seid and Ainsley (http://www.msaworldwide.com
/upload/The%20Relationship%20between%20Franchisor%20and%
20Franchisee.pdf), “. . . franchisors want their franchisees to suc-
ceed and most work hard to provide their franchisees with tools
and coaching they need  to be successful” but one needs to
remember that “a franchisor is not the franchisee’s parent and the
franchisee is not the franchisor’s child.”As a franchisor, KaBloom
provided its franchisees with the following significant support:
• Site location and lease negotiation assistance
• Training (5 weeks headquarters and 3-4 days franchise location)
• Initial store (including base flower assortment and other prod-
ucts) and field support services
• Ongoing operational guidance including inventory control assis-
tance, lower cost of merchandise through group buying, and
centralized distribution and logistics
• Regional and national meetings
• 800 telephone hotline
The level of support provided by KaBloom exceeded what most
franchisors provided and what was required by law.
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pipeline (see Table 7).
In addition to stores, some franchisees opened kiosks
(LaVallee, 2005). Franchisee,Tom Hardy, opened 13 kiosks in
southeastern Massachusetts between mid-2003 and the end
of 2005 and had plans to open several more. Two to three
times per week, two employees from his Pembroke store
replenished the kiosks.These kiosks were located at gas sta-
tions, mini-marts, health centers, and other locations—novel
outlets for selling flowers. KaBloom’s rapid growth was a
result both of stores and other innovative flower retailing
options. In 2002, KaBloom was selling flowers at some Au
Bon Pain cafes and at eleven BJ’s stores (Reidy, 2002).
Au Bon Pain and BJ’s Warehouse Clubs
KaBloom’s operations at other businesses began in 2002 and
were marketed as “KaBloom Too.” KaBloom franchisees
resented the use of “KaBloom” for sales of lower cost flowers
at non-KaBloom store outlets, and many franchisees were
reluctant to service these locations despite their income-pro-
ducing potential. KaBloom’s first relationship was with Au
Bon Pain, a bakery and restaurant with a European flair, and
was short-lived and not profitable.Hartstein had been contact-
ed by Frank Guidara, CEO of Au Bon Pain. Guidara wanted to
have flowers in his stores, both to enhance the European feel
and also as an additional product to sell.They initiated their
partnership at the Children’s Hospital location in Boston, then
expanded to Boylston Street (also Boston). Flowers were
attractively displayed in a spiral fashion on a pole.This opera-
tion was labor intensive and required cleaning of the flower
buckets once or twice a day to prevent infestation by fruit
flies.They soon disbanded the relationship.
At a European flower show, Hartstein saw a unique, attrac-
tive cooler with a waterfall that could display flowers and
eliminate the need to clean the flower buckets. His vision of
selling flowers in every retail location governed his next
moves.He contacted BJ’s Wholesale Club,which had a flower
department already, and suggested a new way to display the
flowers. BJ’s was intrigued and assigned a representative to
work with KaBloom to develop the new system. Hartstein
purchased 80 coolers, had them converted to 110 voltage
from the European 220, committed to maintain them, and
placed them in BJ’s stores. In 2002, KaBloom began servicing
BJ’s warehouse clubs in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
The Woburn, Massachusetts, distribution center easily sup-
ported these stores. KaBloom received 90 percent of BJ’s
flower sales, with 10 percent going to BJ’s.
Customers were enthusiastic and BJ’s asked KaBloom to
expand operations beyond New England to eight or nine
other states, including New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania.These locations could not be supplied and sup-
ported from the Woburn center and required local distribu-
tors, delivery arrangements, and other personnel. The large
overhead that was required made these non-New England
operations nonprofitable. In 2004, on $3.5 million of sales,
KaBloom netted $5,000 profit from their operations at BJ’s.
At the end of 2004, KaBloom subcontracted the BJ’s business
to a grower who paid royalties to KaBloom,generating a con-
siderably higher return.The grower ultimately purchased the
BJ’s business and continued to operate it independently.
Trying Mobile Commerce
In 2004, KaBloom began mobile commerce (m-commerce)
with MobileLime (MobileLime.com). M-commerce included
transactions (i.e., buying merchandise, making payments)
using a mobile phone.The floral industry had been involved
in web-based flower ordering, an example of business-to-con-
sumer (B2C) e-commerce, but m-commerce was unique to
KaBloom. With the implementation of the MobileLime tech-
nology, only KaBloom could communicate with their flower
customers in real-time to remind them of upcoming events,
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holidays and monthly specials, and offer reward programs.
“MobileLime’s technology appeals to the life-style of our busy
customers.As a European-modeled retailer,we strive to offer a
savvy, convenient shopping experience and be one step
ahead of other flower markets. Allowing customers to pre-
approve their transaction before shopping is exactly the
mobility our commuter customers at South Station are look-
ing for,” David Hartstein explained.“This unique and conven-
ient process, will allow more customers to enjoy fresh flow-
ers every day.We are looking forward to utilizing MobileLime’s
technology to simplify shopping for our customers”
(www.seapointventures.com/pr/pr14331220041104.doc).
From 2004–2006, store growth slowed (see Table 7). In
early 2006, there were 117 stores, a 19 percent increase from
the end of 2004 with an accompanying 25 percent increase
in the number of franchisees to 138. This increase was fol-
lowed by increased revenues for KaBloom corporate.
However, problems with franchisees created cash-flow
issues.
A Fading Franchise Operation
The decision of KaBloom management to implement a fran-
chise system and to adopt a decentralized business model
required several managerial changes. Both the size of the
company and the size of the management team increased sig-
nificantly.A hierarchical corporate structure was put in place
to support the franchisees (see Figure 1). For every 10 fran-
chisees, a business consultant was hired. KaBloom later hired
experienced individuals at the vice president level to run the
functional areas (i.e., information technology, marketing,
logistics, and franchising).The vice presidents built organiza-
tions at KaBloom similar in size and cost to the ones at their
former large-company employers, thus creating higher over-
head than the fledgling organization could sustain.The added
managers and supporting teams hired to administer the
expansion created higher corporate payroll demands.A new
distribution system was implemented as a result of the
change in business model.The franchise business consultants
were requiring more cash output than what was coming in.
Committed to his philosophy of local ownership,
Hartstein intended for the franchisees to be owner-operators;
that is, that the franchisees would love flowers and would
work in the stores. He anticipated that they would share his
passion for a nontraditional approach to flower selling, and
that they would be willing to eat, sleep, and drink flowers.
His vision of the perfect franchisee went beyond simply the
ability to pay the fees and royalties. The ideal franchisee
would be part of the community, would participate in com-
munity life, and would, most importantly, love flowers and
share Hartstein’s vision. He expected that the owner-opera-
tors would be happy to work in their stores and would
understand that profits were made one stem at a time.
Additionally, these franchisees should be willing to maintain
the garden environment in their stores and absorb the 10
percent shrinkage required for flower volume, variety, and
quality. But not all franchisees buying KaBloom franchises
were ideal.
When franchising began, KaBloom stores were only locat-
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ed in two states. By the end of 2004, KaBloom stores were in
29 states throughout the United States.Franchises in such dis-
tant (from the Massachusetts headquarters) locations as
Idaho and Texas resulted in extra shipping costs and a
decline in delivered flower quality (see Table 8 store loca-
tions). Hartstein had ideas about how to solve the distribu-
tion issue, but these ideas took additional cash to develop.
When franchisees did not pay their royalties, legal fees to pur-
sue the debt often exceeded the money that was eventually
collected. Some franchisees were not paying for their orders
on time. Because cash inflow was running lower than it
should, the organization took on more debt, and debt service
became an issue.
Franchises were scattered all over the country, from
Pennsylvania on the east coast to California on the west
coast. KaBloom assumed control of ordering flowers for all
its franchisees requiring many small-volume shipments.This
resulted in a major problem for KaBloom since many small
volume orders experienced delivery delays or sometimes
were completely lost by the carriers. As a result of these
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Sweet Factory is a one-of-a-kind retail environment that combines entertainment with space-age
design to provide a state-of-the-art candy and candy-related merchandising concept. Sweet
Factory, as you see it now, was started in the United States on July 12, 1991. Sweet Candy LLC,
was founded in 2002 when it purchased the Sweet Factory candy store chain from the Archibald
Company. Shortly after the purchase of the Sweet Factory chain, Signature Distribution (former-
ly CandyWorkS distribution) was created to provide the logistical and distribution support that
a nationwide chain of specialty candy stores would need. Sweet Factory takes great pride in its
people and in its products. Customer service and quality products are the foundation on which
Sweet Factory is built. Our goal is to build a major national company that will position itself as
a leader in the marketplace, setting the standard for quality products, people and presentation.
CinnaWorkS, LLC, was founded in 2004 when it purchased 83 previously owned Cinnabon
stores. The Support Center for CinnaWorkS is located in Anaheim, California. Cinnabon is the
worldwide leader in the cinnamon roll store category. Founded in Seattle,Washington, in 1985,
Cinnabon opened its first store on December 4, 1985, at SeaTac Mall. Cinnabon stores are tradi-
tionally located in high-traffic venues such as shopping malls, airports, universities, casinos,
amusement parks, military bases, train stations, and travel plazas.The brand has grown dramati-
cally since then. As of December 28, 2003, the company operated and franchised 626 stores
worldwide.These stores are located in 43 states, Puerto Rico, and 26 other countries, leading to
exceptional brand awareness around the world. CinnaWorkS acquired the company-owned and
operated Cinnabon stores on November 22, 2004. CinnaWorkS has an aggressive business
growth plan in place over the next few years.CinnaWorkS stores have built a reputation for serv-
ing fresh, aromatic cinnamon rolls made with premium Indonesian cinnamon and topped with
a sweet, rich, cream cheese-based frosting. Each Cinnabon product is served hot out of the oven
and baked fresh before our guest’s eyes. CinnaWorkS’ commitment to premium ingredients and
quality has paid off.
KaBloom was started in 1998. Our stores are designed to be warm, inviting, modern, and fun
with a large selection of flowers and plants so extensive our customers feel like they are walk-
ing through a European flower market. Our goal is to prove that the future of flower retailing is
called KaBloom. One of KaBloom’s objectives is to increase consumers’ flower-buying habits as
is the case in other countries.We believe flowers should be enjoyed everyday, not just on spe-
cial occasions. So,we make it convenient to shop for flowers—our stores are located in high-vis-
ibility, easily accessible shopping areas; our hours are longer than traditional florists; our staff is
knowledgeable and helpful. Customers are welcomed and invited to enter the walk-in cooler
and choose from a selection of up to 200 fresh cut stems and bouquets (4 times the variety avail-
able from traditional florists).
Figure 2. Excerpt from KaBloom’s Employee Handbook 
(describing the three companies owned by Caliber in 2006)
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delays, the quality of the flowers suffered. In addition, the
price of flowers increased because of the loss in economies
of scale with small volume shipments. Company revenue
decreased dramatically. The new operations model created
new challenges for the company.
The problems with the franchisees seemed never to stop.
As Hartstein resolved one issue, another would crop up.“This
is how you get yourself in trouble with decentralization,”
Hartstein said.KaBloom was buying flowers and selling them
to the franchisees, laying out the money up front to the grow-
er.Once the franchisee ran into trouble paying,KaBloom was
left holding the bag. Because the corporate structure was
decentralized, Hartstein was not aware of every such situa-
tion.“When you are decentralized, many decisions can back-
fire because of the lack of personal responsibility.”
However, there was little room for error when the fee to
the franchisees for flowers was cost plus 10 percent.When
the franchisees did not pay on time and KaBloom had to pay
bills to the grower, lateness created problems all around.The
franchisees who paid on time did not understand why
KaBloom was having trouble paying its bills and demanding
faster payment, and the franchisees who were delaying their
payments continued to have a free ride. By the end of 2005,
between 10 and 12 percent of the franchisees were in
default.
The pressures created by high overhead and low royalty
returns, coupled with nonpayment and late payments result-
ed in a business that simply was not fun anymore for
Hartstein.He decided to cut his losses and sell the enterprise.
KaBloom Wilted in the Shadow of the
Caliber Group
The Caliber Group 
In March 2006, Caliber Capital Group, an equity market
investment group based in Anaheim, California, finalized its
purchase of KaBloom Franchising Corp., creating two enti-
ties, KaBloom Flowers LLC and KaBloom Flower Franchise
LLC. The Caliber Group specialized in acquiring troubled
companies and turning them around. The president of the
investment group and new president of KaBloom, James
Walker, said that the franchise owners would retain their
storefronts, and KaBloom headquarters would move to
Anaheim (SAF, 2006). At the time it acquired KaBloom, the
Caliber Group also owned Sweet Factory, Inc. and
CinnaWorkS, the parent company of Cinnabon. Six months
later, Caliber purchased the Baja Fresh Mexican Grill for $31
million from Wendy’s, which had paid $275 million for it in
2002. (See Figure 2 for a description of KaBloom’s place in
the Caliber Group companies.)
Caliber Capital Group’s experience was both as franchisor
and as franchisee in a wide variety of fast-food businesses.
They had no experience with flowers nor did they develop
an extensive management team for the KaBloom stores
(operating only with a director of Marketing, a rebuyer, and a
director of Franchising), but they did have the capital to
infuse into KaBloom’s bleeding bottom line, and Hartstein
had high hopes for the future success of the company he had
founded. Although differences in approach and philosophy
truncated the working relationship that had been part of the
transition plan shortly after the completion of the sale,
nonetheless Hartstein remained in contact with the Caliber
Group and watched as his creation became its neglected
stepchild.
Unexpected Challenges of Franchising
Even before Caliber Capital Group took over the business,
KaBloom franchising had been a challenge to both the fran-
chisor and the franchisees. When KaBloom began offering
franchises, it did so with prior experience only in the fast-
food world and in an established organization. No one had
experience with “start-up” franchising, so any early missteps
were exaggerated as the company grew.The expectations on
the part of KaBloom and on the part of the franchisees were
unclear despite the extensive due diligence and information
provided in the UFOC. Some franchisees had grandiose
expectations and set up complex internal organizations even
when they had little ability to sustain them financially.
KaBloom’s decentralized organization kept some information
from reaching the right people in headquarters prior to its
acquisition by the Caliber Group, creating serious operating
difficulties and exacerbating KaBloom’s problems.
The franchisees had been hoping for improvement in the
general management of the KaBloom organization once the
Caliber Group had taken over (SAF, 2006), but instead they
were shocked as one corporate support after another was
pulled by the new owners—no more business consultants,
no marketing campaigns in magazines, no special assistance
from headquarters. The business consultants that had been
provided by Hartstein’s organization had been pulled by the
new owners, and the franchisees were essentially on their
own. Fewer and fewer of them were meeting their obliga-
tions to the parent company, and the parent company
responded by pulling back as many services as it could.
The Decline of KaBloom
One of the first actions the Caliber Group took after closing
the deal with Hartstein was to clean house,keeping only two
of KaBloom’s existing employees—the Franchise sales direc-
tor and the general assistant.These two staff members were
responsible for keeping the organization running, from the
legal end through the ordering of flowers. Shortly after the
acquisition, Hartstein’s formal involvement in KaBloom
ended, as did his influence over events.
During the first half of 2006, the Caliber Group poured
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money into its new company. They put together a new ad
campaign originating in the Anaheim and Irvine, California,
communities.The campaign was edgy and expensive, focus-
ing on special effects, high-priced models, and slick staging.
The franchisees hated it—they wanted the emphasis to be on
the flowers, not on the environments. They refused to pay
into the advertising and promotion fund, and the ads were
not redone.
Next, the Caliber Group had the idea to create edible
arrangements that would expand the store offerings.
However, special food handling licenses were required, and
this was too complex to do nationwide.Then, they thought
about including wine in the offerings. Again, the issue of
licensing came up, along with restrictions about shipping
alcoholic beverages across state lines.
Eventually, the Caliber Group’s priorities changed as they
had purchased Baja Fresh in August 2006 and tied up their
financial resources in that company, and their interest in
developing KaBloom waned.
David and the Moses Miracle™
David’s Passion 
Hartstein had started in the flower business in 1998 with a
passion to reinvent the U.S. floral industry along the
European model, in which Europeans purchased flowers at
any time for personal pleasure. In his words “I became pas-
sionate about the business of flowers. I fell in love with it.”
His hard-won experience through the ups and downs of
the business had taught him a valuable lesson—that the
impact of distribution on the quality of flowers was critical.
He had come to realize that the logistics of the flower distri-
bution business were broken and he wanted to fix it. He
wanted to simplify distribution channels and streamline the
entire process.
Preparing Flowers for Shipping
Ninety percent of all flowers sold in the United States were
imported from foreign growers and shipped dry to the United
States. An estimated 77 percent of Americans did not buy 
fresh cut flowers for personal consumption (http://
www.s ie r ra f lower f inder.com/ar t i c le s /mra_e .pd f
Consumption). According to Hartstein, this was principally
because they did not trust that the flowers would last more
than three days in their homes due to the flower distribution
system.The amount of time cut flowers spent in distribution
could vary from 7 to 12 days or perhaps longer.The process
was as follows:Harvest Date (HD)—At most farms around the
world, flowers were typically cut in the morning.They were
transported from the greenhouses to the postharvest cooler
where they were“conditioned”in a solution of citric acid and
hypochlorite sodium.These additives were employed to fight
the constant battle against bacteria as well as promote hydra-
tion in the flower.This conditioning to the flowers was per-
formed in preparation for the long journey to come. Like
camels, the flowers were filling up before they departed.The
conditioning parameters required a minimum of 12 hours of
hydration with this solution to optimize vase-life perform-
ance.
Once the conditioning was complete, which typically
meant the next day (harvest date + 1), the flowers were grad-
ed (quality, length, and cut stage), bunched (arranged and
wrapped), cut again (as the bunch), and placed back into a
cooler where they were hydrated in the same solution for an
additional 4 to 6 hours. They needed this extra hydration
because they were out of water while they were being
processed. At the very end of the processing, they were cut
one last time to remove the section of stem that was drawing
“air”into the bottom of the stem.This condition was called “air
lock” and prevented water from being drawn up the stem.
At this point, the flowers were ready for packing.While in
the cooler, they were removed from the solution and allowed
to ship dry.This typically took 15 to 30 minutes.The flowers
were then packed in corrugated boxes, labeled and staged
for shipment.
The U.S. Distribution Model
In response to the terrorists’ attacks on September 11, 2001,
the U.S. government imposed the "Wheels Up Rule," a
requirement to have cargo documentation submitted to U.S.
Customs 12 hours prior to departure. This requirement
placed responsibility and some degree of “time-sensitive”
pressure on the farm to execute orders that were submitted.
Typically, product left the farm on HD+2. Flights left in the
middle of the night, arriving in Miami in the early morning.
On HD+3 the flowers were processed through USDA
inspection at the "Smoke House" (an older building with a
nonfunctioning smoke stack—the name stuck).The flowers
then departed USDA and were shipped to the various ware-
house distribution centers in the Miami area. Inventory rota-
tion (First-In-First-Out FIFO) often resulted in older flowers
being shipped first and the new arrivals rotated into the cool-
er. Every situation was different. In the best case scenario, the
flowers left in a refrigerated tractor trailer heading some-
where within the United States on the evening of HD+3.
Transit time to a northeast distribution center was two
days, so the flowers arrived on the evening of HD+5 or the
morning of HD+6, where they were subjected to the same
forces of inventory rotation (FIFO). For locations in the Great
Lakes region,distribution transit time was up to three days, for
the west coast it was four. By the time they got to the mass
retail in the northeast, it was HD+6-to-7. For florists, the time
line could be extended further as wholesale distribution prac-
tices varied by company (see Figure 3).The end game for the
wholesale distributor was to offer the freshest product in a
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wide offering while keeping an eye on shrink. Flowers could
“look”good while in a cooler for nearly two weeks. However,
once they were exposed to room temperature, they faded
very quickly.
The Dutch Distribution Model
In stark contrast, Holland had been among the top five in per
capita consumption of fresh cut flowers for many years
(International Labour Organization). A closer examination
revealed three critical variables in the Dutch system that
were absent in the U.S. equation:
• Time was not an issue. Flowers in Holland arrived at the
retail location with 72 hours of harvest, providing supe-
rior freshness (see Figure 4).
• In Holland, from the time flowers were cut, and all the
way through distribution to the retail store, they were
constantly hydrated.
• The Dutch enjoyed a much wider mass market product
offering of fresh cut flowers as delicate varieties were
sold in much higher volumes due to the flower friendly
distribution system.
The Dutch flower distribution system inspired Hartstein’s
vision for what a revamped flower distribution system could
accomplish for the U.S. market.
Innovation in Hydration—the Moses
Miracle™
As early as 2005, Hartstein had been focused on new meth-
ods of keeping flowers fresh longer, and he knew that hydra-
tion was the key. He introduced a prototype, later greatly
improved, of a hydration system before he sold KaBloom to
Caliber, but the product was not yet perfected. Once
KaBloom was sold and franchisees no longer had to purchase
their flowers from specific growers, the Moses Miracle™
could serve no purpose. Hartstein sought to change the rules
governing fresh cut flowers by:
• providing hydration from the time of harvest to the con-
sumer’s home;
• offering the only hydration system that was leak-proof
regardless of the package orientation and therefore
could be express-shipped and could sustain the rigorous
handling requirement of a third-party logistics company
(e.g., FedEx);
• eliminating the distribution risks of delicate varieties to
retail; and 
• shipping more flowers in one box, making it more eco-
nomical in an express shipping venue (third-party logis-
tics).
The Moses Miracle™ was a hydration process that insert-
ed stems into a balloon-like container, tightly closed at the
neck, in order to keep the flowers hydrated during shipping
and before sale.A special foam within the balloon prevented
the water from leaking. In contrast to the inefficiencies of the
existing system, the Moses Miracle™ revolutionized the
industry in the following ways:
• Flowers are harvested in the morning, transported to the
postharvest cooler, and conditioned in a solution of cit-
ric acid and hypo-chloride sodium for a minimum of 12
hours.
• Postharvest pack-out began at 11:00 P.M.when the flow-
ers were graded and packed in the Moses Miracle™,
boxed, and labeled.A similar conditioning solution was
used inside the Moses Miracle™ bladders.
• Flowers were transported the next morning to the
FedEx ramp by 12:00 noon, en route to the FedEx hub
in Memphis,Tennessee.
• Planes departed for Memphis in the late afternoon/early
evening (approximately 6:00 P.M.) and arrived in the
Memphis hub at night (approximately 11:00 p.m.).
• The USDA inspection was conducted at the FedEx
Memphis hub and boxes enter the FedEx “matrix” (gen-
eral distribution system) for sorting and rerouting.
• The flowers were delivered anywhere in the United
States by 10:30 in the morning (within 48 hours of har-
vest).
Unlike flowers from other growers, importers, or distribu-
tors, the flowers shipped with the Moses Miracle™ were
packaged in water and were constantly hydrated regardless
of the position of the bouquet, lying down or standing up.
The Moses Miracle created a competitive advantage because
flowers can be shipped in water coast-to-coast overnight, via
a more extensive and less expensive transportation network
such as UPS, DHL, and FedEx, instead of needing to be trans-
ported via refrigerated trucks (see Table 9).The flowers did
not need to be freshened up after their journey thanks to the
Moses Miracle™. (Visit http://www.3dmedianetwork.com/
projects/kabloom/mm-video/html-designs/home-2-
sides.html for a video of the way the Moses Miracle™
worked.)
Hartstein noted that “We are part of an industry-changing
method of getting the freshest product in the marketplace, in
water and economically shipped.”
Opportunity to Repurchase at Bargain Price
Potential for Success
Hartstein was considering repurchasing the company.He had
a vision of what he could accomplish based on what he had
learned from his prior experience. His vision included three
different opportunities.
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First, he imagined  a better e-business model—an on-line
website just for his franchisees, company stores, and suppli-
ers,where the franchisees could order their flowers from the
suppliers and where Hartstein could monitor the purchases
and immediately receive his cut of the transaction. This
would eliminate the serious problem he had previously
encountered in which he was paying the growers/suppliers
upfront for the flowers and then trying to collect payment
from the franchisees, who had already received the flowers.
This often resulted in getting his money from the franchisees
only after a long delay or, even more often, never receiving
his money at all. He was convinced that a direct sell-through
model would work better.
Second, he had conceived of an idea he called “The Moses
Miracle Flower Wall™,” a refrigerated floral cooler specifical-
ly designed for the Moses Miracle system.The cooler was an
open-faced merchandising system to be placed at or near the
checkout aisles.Since flowers were often an impulse buy, this
location would facilitate the last-minute impulse buying of
flowers.
Third, the Moses Miracle Flower Wall™, coupled with the
Moses Miracle, would allow retailers to sell very fresh flow-
ers because the flowers would arrive at the store within
72–96 hours of harvest.This meant that the quality of flow-
ers would increase dramatically, the life span of the flowers
would expand, and retailers who had given up on the idea of
selling flowers because they did not remain fresh very long,
such as drugstores and gas stations, could now sell fresh
flowers.The Moses Miracle™ would even serve as a package
in which the flowers could be transported from the store to
the customer’s home in their own hydration system.
Consumers would no longer have to rush home to put their
newly purchased flowers in water.
Hartstein felt the future would be his, if the price and the
deal were right.
Fighting the Miami Cabal  
For the unique system to succeed, several issues had to be
resolved, including the delivery system and the traditional
grower power structure. The vast majority of flowers from
South America came through Miami.The Miami flower con-
sortium was comprised of wholesalers with exclusive rela-
tionships with growers. Growers did not sell flowers directly
to individuals, only to wholesalers. This arrangement meant
that KaBloom either had to pay the high overhead for flowers
through the wholesalers or find a different way altogether.
Hartstein chose the second option. He convinced a major
grower, Elite Flower Limitada, C.I., to partner with him and
adapt logistics to the new model. This alliance provided
KaBloom with the protection it needed to bypass the tradi-
tional route. Flower costs could thus be decreased by elimi-
nating the middleman (the wholesaler).
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Doing Without an Organization
Because the weight of his complex organization had played
a large role in KaBloom’s initial failure, Hartstein was deter-
mined not to repeat that error. If he decided to repurchase,
this time he would keep his organization small, outsourcing
every possible function.“This time,”he vowed,“I will remem-
ber how to make money. If I outsource, I can get the best peo-
ple who will give me the best service in the best way.This
depressed economy can only help me by making the best
people available.” He would limit his total staff to himself, his
partner (an attorney), and a few store personnel. He would
operate out of the main company store in Brookline, without
a formal office.As long as he had his cell phone, he could be
in business.
He thought he could outsource all accounting functions,
along with payroll and IT. He could hire a programmer on
contract to redesign the website and to handle all the techni-
cal issues so he could devote himself to the business and to
rebuilding his diminished customer database. He could out-
source marketing for improved quality.And, he could depend
on third-party logistics to move the flowers.
“I listened to the wrong advice the first time around,”
Hartstein said. “I know how to make money—you buy for
one dollar, you sell for two dollars, you look around you with
your two eyes and you know how you’re doing. You don’t
need an organization to do business that way. If you build a
huge organization because you have money to spend, one
day soon the money will run out and you won’t be able to
make the organization run.”
The Decision
As of February 2008, Hartstein had begun seriously to evalu-
ate his options, weighing his emotions versus the practicali-
ties of a repurchase. If he repurchased KaBloom, he would
have a lot of work to do.The database needed to be rebuilt.
E-commerce sales had dropped from $4 million to less than
$100K. The franchisees were unhappy and many were in
default.The website was not functioning well.He would have
to go up against the floral establishment in Miami and he
would have to get the growers on his side. He would have to
establish iron-clad agreements with the third-party logistics
companies, and he would have to rethink his franchising
strategy. Moreover, he would have to do this without benefit
of an extensive and experienced organization.
But Hartstein was not afraid of work.“Hard work is what I
grew up with,” he said.“I started as a baby in retail, sleeping
on my little bench in the butcher shop until my parents were
ready to go home.When you’re in retail, every day you start
the business again; this will be no different.”
The Moses Miracle™ could truly revolutionize the flower
business, making flowers accessible to American consumers
at every level, Hartstein believed.This would fulfill his vision
and would confirm his belief that the business was about
logistics, not about flowers.
KaBloom Logistics 2008
In accord with Hartstein’s new lean organization,distribution
and logistics were outsourced to international shipping and
logistics companies, FedEx and UPS. He introduced two dif-
ferent paths for delivering flowers from the growers to the
store: Columbian flowers were shipped via FedEx while UPS
handled flowers from Ecuador. In both locations, flowers
were prepared for shipment using the Moses Miracle™.
Due to the unstable cost of fuel in 2008, both UPS and
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Table 9. Comparison of Distribution Systems
KaBloom (No Moses Miracle) Dutch KaBloom with Moses Miracle
Harvest Day (HD) Harvest at farm Harvest at farm and hydrate Harvest at farm Hydrated 12 hours
HD+1 Flower conditioning Hydrated and transfer Prepared with Moses Miracle and
depart for Memphis airport
HD+2 Arrive local airport and flown to Miami Hydrated and transfer Arrive Memphis
HD+3 USDA inspection at Miami Arrive at retail stores USDA inspection at Memphis and
entered into FedEx distribution system
HD+4 Leave by truck to distribution centers (DC) Arrive at stores and customers
HD+5 Arrive NE DC
HD+6 Depart NE DC for stores Arrive Great Lakes DC
HD+7 Depart for  Midwest stores Arrive West Coast DC
HD+8 Depart for West Coast stores
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FedEx set their delivery rate on a monthly basis instead of
their earlier protocol of setting prices annually. Flowers ship-
ping from Colombia left the farm and arrived at the Bogota
airport within one day after harvest (HD), and were then
transported to Miami via Tampa Cargo SA under contract
with FedEx. At the Miami airport, flowers were precooled
and inspected by the USDA. In the evening of HD+2, flowers
were shipped in refrigerated trucks by FedEx to Memphis
(the FedEx hub), arriving the morning of HD+4. Normal
FedEx distribution channels delivered the flowers to stores
and customers.
Flowers shipping from Ecuador arrived at the Quito airport
within HD+1 and shipped to Miami via UPS planes.There was
no cold chain in effect on this route. In Miami, the flowers
were inspected but not cooled. UPS planes transported the
flowers from Miami to Louisville, Kentucky (UPS hub), and
then to stores or customers.The UPS nonrefrigeration model
delivered the flowers two days faster than the FedEx refriger-
ated one with no discernable degradation of flower quality.
Reacquisition
In March 2008, two years after his sale of KaBloom to the
Caliber Group, Hartstein reacquired the company. The
Caliber Group admitted it had made a huge mistake in buy-
ing KaBloom in the first place, and lost a significant amount
of money during the two years it held the flower enterprise.
It was little more than an annoyance to them, “a tick on a
dog,” as the Caliber Group phrased it.
But a tick on a dog can make a lot of trouble for the dog.
Hartstein reentered the flower business with a vengeance,
meeting with the franchisees and listening to their concerns.
Some of them felt betrayed,others were angry because of the
size of the shrink that he insisted on.Franchisees wanted 1 to
2 percent shrink, while Hartstein insisted that they had to
plan on 10 percent in order to provide the garden-like envi-
ronment that was so critical to the KaBloom image. He
offered reduced royalties to the franchisees who paid their
outstanding bills. He took a hard-nosed approach to the busi-
ness, determined not to be the “nice guy” who gets stuck
with bills. He designed a new mass market strategy and
began negotiations with new outlets and new markets.He set
up agreements with several growers. He moved fast, focusing
more on B2B sales (developing new retail opportunities
instead of building stores) than on B2C sales.The B2B com-
ponent of the industry comprised about 15 to 20 percent of
a retail florist’s business. This included sales to restaurants,
meeting facilities, hotels, corporate functions, and business
client gifts (SAF, 2006).
At this point, Hartstein had to consider multiple strategic
questions:What would be the most effective way to grow the
business? What criteria should he use to choose the best fran-
chisees for his revamped business? What assumptions had he
made in the past that may have contributed to his problems?
What blind spots did he have that he should watch out for in
future decision making? What aspects of the fast-food indus-
try’s approach to logistics and distribution were transferable
to the flower business, if any? How could he make money
from the flower business?
“It’s about logistics and distribution, not just flowers,”
Hartstein reminded himself three months later as he watched
the price of oil escalate to more than $135 a barrel and the
economy fall apart.“Isn’t it? Or have I made a terrible mistake?”
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